Update on US midterms

More than a fortnight after polling day the United States, in its leisurely and decentralised fashion, is still counting the votes from its mid-term congressional elections. On Wednesday the last Senate seat, in Alaska, was finally declared by all the networks as a Democrat victory, although the result had been clear for more than a week. That gives the Democrats 22 of the 35 Senate seats up for election, a gain of nine, for a 56-44 majority in the new Senate.

The House of Representatives result was just as impressive. A handful of seats are yet to be declared but none look in serious doubt; the Democrats have picked up 45 seats to win an 85-seat majority, 260 to 175. With a few million votes still to be counted they are currently sitting on 56.2% of the vote, a swing of 9.0% from 2024 and the highest vote achieved by either party since the Democrat landslide of 1974, when they had 57.5%.* It’s the first time since 2006 that both houses have changed hands at once.

For once, the postmortems seem to be more intense on the winning side than among the losers. The Republicans know perfectly well what went wrong for them: it was Donald Trump. But that’s not a problem that can be addressed overnight; breaking away from Trump’s influence will be a long-term project, and so far the discussion about it, with occasional exceptions, seems to be mostly happening behind closed doors.

The Democrats, on the other hand, are divided over what lessons to draw from their victory. The year saw some heated primary battles, several of which were won by markedly left-wing candidates – Peggy Flanagan for Senate in Minnesota, Abdul El-Sayed in Michigan, Angie Nixon in Florida – despite warnings that they were electorally risky prospects. Other candidates were conspicuously moderate, including a number with strong religious backgrounds.

On the surface, at least, the moderates have had the better of the argument. Identifiably leftist candidates generally didn’t perform so well: Flanagan and El-Sayed both won their seats, but they ran about two points behind the more moderate candidates for governor in the same states. Nixon outperformed the polls, although she still lost, but also fared noticeably worse than the candidate for governor.

But it’s not as simple as that. Coming from opposite sides of the debate, Jon Chait and Matt Bruenig agree both that the electoral penalty for extremism is quite small and possibly declining, and also that even if it’s substantial that doesn’t decide the question: parties are entitled (perhaps obliged) to pursue what they believe to be good policy even if some alternative would in the short term be more popular.

Moreover, it’s not always obvious what counts as extremism in the first place. Chait concludes his piece by dismissing as a “fantasy” the idea “that left-wing economic policy is so popular that the party does not need to compromise on any social policies.” But the case from the left, or at least part of it (as put by Branko Marcetic in Jacobin magazine), is that the so-called “moderates” have actually embraced the left’s economics: “taking several pages — whole chapters, really — from the books of Bernie Sanders, Zohran Mamdani, and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez.”

And for the party’s socialists (if that’s what they are), it’s economics that really matters – they will happily join with the moderates in throwing women, immigrants and trans people under the bus. But whether attacking monopolists and criticising tariffs can fairly be described as socialism is another question.

* Note that these are raw percentages, not two-party votes, but the third-party vote is so small (1.5% this time) that it’s not worth worrying about the difference.

Leave a Reply

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed.