Not everyone shared Vladimir Putin’s apparent belief that it would all be over in a couple of weeks, but few could have imagined that his war on Ukraine would drag on for more than four and a half years. (At least as a conventional war – some of us imagined a long Ukrainian guerilla resistance against Russian occupation.) Yet here we are: the front line has been mostly stable for the last four years, with apparently neither side able to win a decisive advantage.
The diplomatic front has been something more of a roller-coaster ride, but there too the breakthrough has been lacking. Putin appeared to gain the upper hand with the election of a sympathetic American president in 2024, but although Donald Trump has clearly signalled his dislike of Ukraine and his willingness to endorse a pro-Russian peace, he has been unable to land the prize.
Now, perhaps jolted by its electoral repudiation earlier this month, the Trump administration seems to be moving. On Saturday, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky told the world that American negotiators had suggested the framework of a deal: that Ukraine would withdraw from the whole of the Donbas (Donetsk and Luhansk provinces) in return for membership in NATO.
Ukraine, reasonably enough, has always resisted the idea of giving up territory. But Zelensky is no fool; he knows that he cannot prevail against US hostility. He also knows, as I’ve emphasised before, that the war is not fundamentally about territory: it’s about the future status of Ukraine. Ukraine wants independence and ultimately integration with Europe, while Russia wants Ukraine as a dependency.
NATO membership is the one guarantee of independence that would be strong enough to potentially outweigh the strategic damage of giving up the Donbas. The fact that Zelensky went public, quite apart from what he actually said, shows that he finds the offer tempting. The Americans, led by Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, played down the idea but did not deny what had been said.
Putin, of course, will be totally opposed to the idea. But if it’s really on the table it will put him in a difficult position. It’s such an obviously reasonable compromise that rejection out of hand would be a blow to his credibility – especially in the White House, where he needs it most. And it may put the spotlight back on him, pushing him to come up with a counter-offer: just how much of his territorial claim would he be willing to give up in return for Ukrainian neutrality?
In early 2022, in the lead-up to the Russian invasion, I argued that Putin was bluffing: that his military buildup was designed to either intimidate the Ukrainians into making concessions or provoke them into starting a war. In this I was quite wrong (I was not the only one). But I still think that I was correct about the strategic logic of the situation; that subjugation of Ukraine was not militarily achievable, and that a lesser aim – such as conquest of the Donbas – was not worth the pain.
Putin’s overconfidence led him to ignore that logic, greatly to his cost. He did manage to hang on until his American ally returned to power, but even then he continued pitching his demands too high. There are limits to what Trump can give him; limits imposed by the Europeans, by Ukraine’s own resistance, and increasingly by the domestic political situation in the United States. Trump admires Putin and is in a sense a co-conspirator with him, but fundamentally he is out for his own interests, not for Putin’s.
He also loves the grand, showy gesture, and it’s easy to see how the idea of a sweeping bargain, Donbas for NATO, might appeal to him. The people of the Donbas might have a different view, but it seems unlikely that anyone will ask them.