As you’ve no doubt heard, Iran and the United States have agreed on terms to end the war between them that Donald Trump launched at the end of February. There’s been exhaustive analysis of them in the media, but the consensus is that they represent, if not abject surrender by the US, at least a more favorable result for Iran than most people expected at the start.
A more conventional Republican president – perhaps a more conventional leader of any sort – might well have doubled down at this point rather than confess to failure, committing more resources for a long conflict. But Trump does not have that sort of patience or attention span, and nor does he have the love of warfare for its own sake that characterises so much of the Republican mainstream.
Back in April, in the course of a generally gloomy assessment, I said that “The one saving grace is that just as a decision to start a war can be made on the spur of the moment with no particular logic, a decision to end it can be made the same way. … If the mood so strikes him, [Trump] will be shameless about abandoning any previous threats, promises or deadlines.” And that’s pretty much what happened. The war was costly, difficult and unpopular, so Trump decided to pay whatever price the Iranians demanded for ending it.
The outcome reflects Trump’s capriciousness, but it’s not necessarily wise to point that out: on the contrary, lack of commitment to war is something to be encouraged. And while it’s understandable that some Democrats (not to mention the Iranians) have been unable to resist the temptation to draw attention to the way in which the settlement falls short of American goals, it’s the war itself that should be the object of their attacks, not the decision to end it.
As Iran analyst Trita Parsi puts it, the idea that the US should expect better terms is fatally flawed:
Taken seriously, that logic leads to a dangerous conclusion: that a failed war must continue until the battlefield fortunes somehow improve and a more favorable outcome becomes attainable. …
Wars become interminable when leaders convince themselves that ending them without victory is politically more costly than continuing them without hope.
You’ll be able to think of many examples of past wars that have succumbed to just that logic. Nor is it just political costs: many war leaders have been prisoners not of public opinion so much as of their own psychological need to believe in victory.
Here it seems that Trump’s fragmented thought process is an asset – he doesn’t make the connection between the unsatisfactory peace and his decision to go to war in the first place. Stuff just happens. And when there’s a risk that things might be unpopular, he can always push someone else to the forefront to take responsibility for them: hence JD Vance’s prominent role in both negotiating and defending the Iran deal.
Vance represents that wing of the administration that was opposed to the war in the first place: not due to any great love of peace, but from a dislike of American power (for its virtues, not for its since) and especially a dislike of Israel. He now gets to say “I told you so,” even if only under his breath, and he also, with obvious relish, gets to put the Israeli government in its place.
This new-found willingness of the Americans to rein in Israel is an important step forward for the region, as is the more general discrediting of the whole neoconservative project of perpetual war. But there are no good guys in the Trump team; a loss for the neocons and the imperialists means, as I said last time, that “the party’s nativists, Putinists and antisemites will gain.” Among the casualties will be the democratic opposition in Iran, left in the lurch in completely unsurprising fashion.
Jonathan Chait explained it neatly this week:
While the neoconservative impetus to prevent a nuclear Iran is rooted in a hatred and fear of its radical government, Trump has never held an ideological grudge against a foreign power. His geopolitical vision is personal. To the extent that a country’s authoritarian character factors into his assessment, it is generally a plus.
By winning the war, Iran’s leaders have earned Trump’s respect, and now that he respects them he feels no need to defeat them. The reasoning is circular, but in this case the circle at least leads to an end to the fighting.
The World is Not Enough 