One of the good things about the last decade or two in Australian politics – and good news on that score can be hard to find; we have to take what we can get – is that it’s become the norm for parties to make their internal reviews public. Back in 2011, for example, this was still sufficiently novel for me to remark on it in the case of Labor’s review of its performance in the previous year’s Victorian election.
So what on earth Liberal leader Angus Taylor and his followers were thinking (if “thinking” is not too generous a word) when they decided to suppress the party’s review of last year’s federal election is hard to fathom. It was blindingly obvious both that (a) the review would quickly leak into the public domain anyway and (b) it would get more damaging publicity as a result than if it had been quietly released in the ordinary way.
And sure enough, this week it all came out: Anthony Albanese tabled a leaked copy of the review in parliament on Tuesday, and it’s now all over the internet. You can read it at Channel Nine’s site here, or at Crikey’s here, or in many other places. It’s well worth a look.
Of course we did not need the review to tell us that last year’s Liberal campaign was a disaster. Moreover, there is a danger of post hoc reasoning with this sort of thing: as Peter Brent never tires of reminding us, perceptions of political campaigns are overwhelmingly driven by results. A leader who was until that point regarded as a genius will, after losing an election, suddenly be portrayed as having been useless all along (and conversely for the winner).
Some of that is happening here. Although there was the usual low-level grumbling, three months before last year’s election it was hard to find anyone who thought the Liberal leadership and campaign were anything worse than average. The review impressively documents a host of failings, but it neglects to ask how exceptional they were. Its authors do not seem to have considered whether similar things could have been said of previous, more successful, campaigns – except that in a successful campaign, nobody looks for these things.
It’s all too easy to assume that because a party is dysfunctional and lost an election badly, those two things must be causally related. And an internal review like this one is predisposed to think that, because internal problems – things like the timing of advertising, or the relationship between the secretariat and the leader’s office, or the number of female candidates – are, if not exactly easy to fix, at least relatively simple to propose solutions for.
If, by contrast, the real problem is to do with deeper structural or ideological factors, then addressing it would open a much bigger can of worms. To pick one example: the review contains a section (pp. 39-41) on Teal seats, with ideas for more effective campaigning against the Teals. But there is nothing in it about why voters might actually prefer Teal policies to those of the Liberals. What if the optimal strategy for the party is not to fight the Teals but to lure them back into the fold, as it did with the Liberal Movement in the 1970s? The review is unable to consider a question like that.
Similarly, on page 19, there is a discussion of the effect on the campaign of the growing unpopularity of Donald Trump. The review concludes that this “required a nimble and flexible response from the Opposition Leader and emphatic demonstration that there was no similarity between the two.” It therefore simply ignores the fact that objectively there was a similarity between Trump and Peter Dutton: the perception was a problem because the underlying reality was a problem.
While I don’t dispute that in this election they were worse than usual, the problems that the review identifies are not new. (The review even notes that previous reviews have made the same points and been ignored.) Rivalry between the parliamentary leadership and the organisation was baked into the party from the start; over-centralisation of campaigns has been complained about for decades; so have rushed preselections, inadequate policy development and pollsters who are high on their own supply. Addressing these and other problems would be well worthwhile, but it still would not really tackle the problem of why the party lost so badly this time.
The fundamental problem is that the party has decided to become something that voters do not want, and to preach to those voters rather than trying to convert them. (For more detail, see my series last month on “Crisis on the right”.) But the review does not tell us that: perhaps because its principals, Pru Goward and Nick Minchin, had different perspectives on it, or because they knew that such a message would just be ignored, or simply because it was all too hard.
Nonetheless, there is an ideological message there if you read between the lines. The review knows that the Liberal Party has lost touch with mainstream Australia and has no plan to recover. It cannot present it with such a plan and cannot even openly admit to the need for one, but every now and then pieces of the reality seep through, as with the quote on page 36 (attributed to “Several unsuccessful metropolitan candidates and senators”) that “the Liberal Party needs to understand Australia as it is and not how we would like it to be.”
As Bernard Keane points out, that is enough to explain why Taylor, determined to make no concession to the interests of women, young people and (especially) immigrants, was so reluctant to see the review made public. Or perhaps he is really just a deep cover agent for the Teals and was trying to give it the maximum possible publicity.
Suppose, hypothetically, there were a country where there were two competing political parties which were supported by two different groups in the population, each of them promoting policies favoured by the group that supported them (the two groups having different policy preferences); and suppose, further, that one of these groups clearly outnumbered the other. In that situation, the party supported by the minority group and advocating its preferred policies would be at a huge electoral disadvantage; but it’s easy to see that ‘Change your policies to the ones preferred by the majority’ would be a difficult solution to accept. ‘The majority group already has a party promoting its preferred policies! and we exist to represent our supporters, who want something different!’
In this hypothetical (and obviously over-simplified) scenario, it’s not hard to imagine that the minority party’s main strategy for trying to win elections would be dishonesty.
In what ways (if any) this applies to any real and therefore more complex situation I leave as an exercise for the reader.
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There are many policy preferences in Australia and many people who support a variety of policies. The Liberal party had been able to retain a critical connection to public opinion, so that it could form many governments. But they made deliberate decisions to accept more members who had strong and divergent views.
And people don’t really have strongly held policy preferences like your scenario requires. There isn’t a solid majority view. Australians’ views have changed and they’re changing and they’re going to change again.
As to the conclusion, it’s not at all clear to me that the Liberal party tried to win the last election by dishonesty. If anything, as far as campaigns go, they seemed fairly clear (but not homogeneous) in what they wanted. Charles’ presentation, that they preached instead of trying to reach out, was a much better characterisation. One of the Coalition’s major messages to inner metropolitan voters was that they would have to be prepared to lose the election because the rural, regional and outer suburban voters all held a different, conservative set of values.
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Of course. I did mention that my scenario was obviously over-simplified, but even with that it wasn’t a model where there are only two groups in the population and only two sets of policy preferences–I was careful not to write something like that.
The Liberal Party has won many elections; it has also lost many elections. Each win and each loss has been the result of a combination of factors, a different one each time. I’m not sure exactly what it might mean to ‘retain a connection to’ public opinion, but whatever it means I’m sure that the result of all elections can’t be explained just by saying ‘the election was won by the side which had a better connection to public opinion’.
My scenario doesn’t require that everybody have policy preferences and it doesn’t require that the people who do hold them strongly. Many people do have policy preferences, and in some cases they are held strongly, but even people who don’t have strongly held policy preferences can still have attitudes, values or interests and then prefer policies which seem to them to align with those attitudes, values or interests.
I did not draw that conclusion.
I’m not sure whether that is the message the Coalition was trying to send, but when any political party tries to send a message, it is at least possible that the message is a dishonest one.
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That’s an interesting point, J-D. There are certainly places where politics does seem to work like that, particularly where there’s an ethnic basis to parties, or a rich-vs-poor division. The minority party in that position needs to try to reorient the spectrum to get people to vote on issues other than the one(s) on which they’re finding themselves constantly in the minority. That’s not always easy, but it does happen. And it’s probably more likely to work than simply copying the policies of the party in power.
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