January is mostly a quiet month, so I’ll take the opportunity from time to time to recommend some interesting reading material. First up, a post from just before Christmas by Kevin Bonham that explains the importance (or, more often, unimportance) of parties’ decisions about preferences and tries to dispel some popular myths.
If you’re at all interested in Australian elections, please read the whole thing. Bonham is one of our best psephologists, and he has little patience with those who peddle nonsense and spread confusion.
His basic point is that how parties direct their preferences is less significant than is popularly believed. He estimates that changes in the flow of preferences at federal elections over time have had only about one-tenth of the effect of changes in the primary vote of the major parties. For any particular minor party, the way that its preferences flow rarely changes much, and generally doesn’t respond very well to what its how-to-vote cards say.
The particular relevance at the moment is with talk of the supposed threat posed to Labor by preferences from right-wing minor parties, especially Clive Palmer’s “United Australia Party”. Nick Dyrenfurth, head of the John Curtin centre, a Labor right think-tank, argued earlier this week [link fixed] that “the spectre of Clive … looms large over the election,” and that his party’s support is “a game changer in close contests if its 2019 preference deal is replicated.”
This is exactly the sort of claim that Bonham is trying to rebut. As he puts it:
The claim that Clive Palmer delivered government to the Coalition via United Australia Party preferences is a widespread myth on Twitter, spread mainly by accounts that seek to blame Palmer for the result rather than blame the basic fact that Labor’s primary vote was way too low.
Dyrenfurth compares Palmer’s party to the DLP, which used to hurt Labor by attracting natural Labor voters and inducing them to give preferences to the Coalition. It’s not impossible that Palmer may do that to some extent, but there’s no real evidence for it. Bonham again:
We don’t actually know what percentage of UAP voters even follow Reps how-to-vote cards but I suspect from the Senate it is quite low … The 2019 UAP flow can be explained just fine by (i) The UAP attacking Labor heavily and therefore being more attractive to voters who disliked Labor anyway (ii) The UAP’s natural support base including outer-suburban demographics that swung against Labor …
If people vote for a right-wing minor party and then preference the Coalition, it’s most probable that in the absence of that minor party, they would just have voted for the Coalition outright. Whether or not those people were Labor voters in the first place is irrelevant: what matters is not where the votes were coming from, but where – absent Palmer or the like – they were going to.
This brings us back to a point that I’ve made a number of times before: debates about preferences that are couched in terms of tactics are in fact usually about ideology. Dyrenfurth is not arguing in a vacuum; he wants Palmer to be important, because he wants to move Labor’s position closer to that of Palmer’s voters.
He and others like him want Labor to stop talking about corruption and climate change and focus on more traditional working-class issues. That may or may not be good politics, but it’s something that’s independently motivated, not a consequence of some detached analysis of preferences.
We can see that from looking at the flip side of the preference argument: if a strong vote for Palmer is hurting Labor, then a strong vote for the Greens must equally be hurting the Coalition, by luring away its natural supporters and delivering their preferences to Labor. In fact there’s more reason to believe this than in the Palmer case, since the Greens vote is both larger and more disciplined. But don’t expect to hear that argument from the folks at the Curtin centre.