As financial year 2024-25 comes to a close, it’s a good opportunity to catch up on some loose ends from past stories that we’ve covered here.
United States
Back in 2020 I reported on the debate in the United States over turning the District of Columbia into a state. I expressed scepticism about the idea, and suggested that it would be better to either pursue a constitutional amendment to give representation to the territories, or else give most of DC back to Maryland.
A lot has changed in US politics since then, and a recent piece by Michael Schaffer at Politico explains that the Maryland option is now getting some traction. He notes that the city’s Democrat leadership is still committed to the dream of statehood, but argues that this is not only politically unachievable but may also be less desirable from the residents’ point of view: “Would you rather live in a place that has to create a real university system or judiciary based on a population only a bit larger than tiny Vermont or Wyoming — or join a decently sized state that does that stuff pretty well already?”
Italy
On a couple of occasions (here, for example) I’ve pointed to Italian prime minister Giorgia Meloni as an example of a far-right leader who plays by the constitutional rules and can potentially be brought within the bounds of democratic politics. I’ve largely agreed with James Panichi, who when she took office remarked that her party “is the most democratically inclined and sanest of the three parties of the right and centre right that form the new government.”
It’s therefore only fair to draw attention to a contrary view, expressed in an article in Foreign Affairs by Nathalie Tocci, director of the Institute of International Affairs in Rome. She refers to “the false promise of moderation,” arguing that Meloni’s gestures towards the centre have been purely tactical and that she remains an authoritarian at heart – a potential “Trojan horse” for a Trumpian assault on Europe.
I’m not fully convinced, but it’s an important argument to consider, raising questions about just what features of far-right politics represent the main threat to freedom and democracy.
Azerbaijan
Readers may remember our coverage of the long-running conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which culminated in 2023 in the victory of Azerbaijan and the expulsion of Armenians from Artsakh. Azerbaijan’s authoritarian leader, Ilham Aliyev, took the opportunity to win re-election in a sham election last year, having been in the job since 2003.
But because Armenia has traditionally been a Russian ally and Azerbaijan has not, and because Europe wants Azerbaijan’s oil and gas, the European Union has tended to favor Azerbaijan, notably with a visit there in April by its foreign minister, Kaja Kallas. Writing at Politico, Mark McInnes, a Conservative member of Britain’s House of Lords, attacks this betrayal of democracy, arguing that “Armenia is doing everything the EU asked of its Eastern partners” while “Azerbaijan has become the quintessential autocracy.”
Bougainville
Another long-running story is on our doorstep: the Bougainvillean people’s struggle for independence. A referendum in 2019 showed near-unanimous support, but Papua New Guinea has continued to drag its feet, backed at least implicitly by Australia and other western powers.
A recent piece by Anna-Karina Hermkens at the Conversation gives a thorough review of the issue, including Australia’s role. She quotes Bougainville’s president, Ishmael Toroama, saying that 1 September next year is his “benchmark” for when independence will be declared, setting off a potential scramble by the great powers for influence in the new nation.
South Korea
South Korea has been a big story in recent months, with the coup attempt by president Yoon Suk-yeol last December, his subsequent impeachment and removal from office, and the election earlier this month of his replacement, Lee Jae-myung.
An analysis by Jae-seung Lee and Dae-joong Lee published by the Institute of International Affairs does a good job of drawing out the lessons to be learnt from Yoon’s failure, including the importance of the “high level of understanding and the strong commitment of Korean citizens to democracy” and “the crucial role of constitutional checks and balances in safeguarding democratic resilience.”
Iran
A fortnight ago I tried to explain why I thought that Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, while certainly not something to be desired, would not be the existential crisis that most pundits seemed to think. Today Benjamin Zala at the Conversation reaches the same conclusion. As he puts it, “the idea that a nuclear-armed Iran would pose a unique risk to Israel or the United States simply does not stand up to scrutiny. If we can live with a nuclear-armed North Korea, nuclear-armed Pakistan, and for that matter, a nuclear-armed Israel, we can live, however reluctantly, with a nuclear-armed Iran.”
On the same subject, don’t miss Michael Bradley in Crikey, explaining how self-defence works in international law, and Hanin Majadli in Haaretz, arguing that Israel has abandoned its traditional strategic doctrines and adopted “an unrestrained worldview – one devoid of moral, legal, or even pragmatic boundaries.”