Younger readers may need to be reminded that I was a strong opponent of the American invasion of Iraq, now 22 years in the past. If you’re interested, you can read a compilation of my views that I prepared in 2023 for the twentieth anniversary.
A key point to take from that is that I opposed the war not for the sake of its immediate effect on Iraq, which I accepted was quite likely to be beneficial, but because of the outrage against international law and the associated risk of prompting further outrages in the future. That view, I think, has been vindicated. Iraq itself has painfully built something like a functioning democracy; it is better off than it was in the days of Saddam Hussein. But the world as a whole is a much more dangerous place.
Now, showcasing some of that danger, the United States has again gone on the offensive in the Middle East, this time against Iran. This too is a violation of international law; it is also a violation of American domestic law, having, unlike the Iraq war, been undertaken without congressional authorisation.
In the case of Iraq, a fig leaf of legal justification was constructed in the shape of the United Nations authorisation of the first Iraq war, in 1991, which was argued to have continuing effect. This was a bad argument, but it was enough to allow some otherwise sensible people to convince themselves to support the invasion. There is no sign of that this time: progressive opinion seems united against the attack.
In the case of Iraq, contempt for international law seemed to be part of the motive. But whereas that was a matter of showcasing the power and lawlessness of the United States, the weekend’s attack is more about Donald Trump’s ability to defy world opinion and push back against any constraints. He cares about American power only to the extent that he can wield it personally.
The architects of the Iraq invasion, principally Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld, were playing symbolic politics, but they were doing so via a real, practical objective: to overthrow Saddam and install their own government in Iraq. Trump’s objectives lack that coherence. As I put in a previous “compare and contrast” five years ago, his “politics is not about dealing with real issues, but about putting on a show to rally the tribe and to demonise its enemies.”
Cheney and Rumsfeld were not fools. They had unrealistic expectations of post-war Iraq, but they at least knew that the invasion itself was a serious business; it was carefully planned and efficiently executed. There is no sign of that this time. No doubt the Pentagon has had some Iran war plans in a drawer for years if not decades, but getting from that to actually toppling the Iranian regime is a big task. A few air strikes and some Trumpian bluster are not going to cut it.
Iran also, of course, is much bigger and more powerful than Iraq was (by roughly a factor of four in both population and area). And while its government is deservedly unpopular, it is not the naked dictatorship that Saddam’s was: it has a constitutional basis and will be better placed to rally popular support – as even the worst of regimes often manage to do when under foreign attack.
Once Saddam’s regime had been disposed of the occupation of Iraq bogged down; insufficient thought had been given to how to proceed to the next stage. But at least the objective at that point was sensible, namely the creation of a democratic government. Trump, however, is not even rhetorically a fan of democracy, and his campaign is hostage (as the Iraq invasion never was) to the priorities of its ally Israel, which has always opposed the emergence of democracy anywhere among its neighbors.
Iran also has allies, notably Vladimir Putin’s Russia, to which it has given some support in its invasion of Ukraine. If Putin is minded to return the favor he may try to call in some of his influence with Trump, which poses further dangers for the world: it may escalate the conflict, or alternatively Trump may try to buy off Russia with further concessions at the expense of Ukraine.
Most of these differences combine to make the attack on Iran look even more immoral and foolhardy than its Iraqi predecessor. The big factor counting – so far – the other way is that this is not yet a full-scale war. With Iraq, the US was all-in; once the war started it had to be fought to its inevitable conclusion. That’s not the case in Iran: there has been an attack, there will presumably be some sort of Iranian response, and it is possible that matters will stop there. Much damage will still have been done, but the worst could still be avoided.
That will require, however, a great deal more wisdom and common sense than the records of any of the major participants have given us any right to expect.
The World is Not Enough 