Manifest destiny, part 1: Greenland

I remarked last month that Donald Trump was that rather unusual thing, “an imperialist who doesn’t much like war.” The desire for peace shows up in his policy towards Ukraine, disastrous as that might be beyond the short term. His imperialism seems less likely to have quick results, but it has already been on display. There are plans of varying seriousness for the expansion of the United States to such places as Greenland, Canada, the Panama canal zone and the Gaza strip.

For much of its history, territorial expansion has been a major issue in US politics. In the course of the nineteenth century, the country grew by assorted means from its original base on the Atlantic coast to its now familiar extent, about four times the size. But none of Trump’s recent predecessors have had to much concern themselves with it; there have been no major additions of territory for more than a hundred years.*

The last imperialist venture was the Spanish-American War of 1898, undertaken by one of Trump’s heroes, president William McKinley. As a result, Spain ceded Cuba, the Philippines, Guam and Puerto Rico to the US. Cuba was quickly given independence, at least nominally (it remained in effect a US protectorate for decades), but the Philippines had to wait until 1946, and the other two are still US territory.

In 1917 there was a further addition, but it was peaceful: Denmark sold the US its share of the Virgin Islands for 25 million dollars. Denmark had been trying to get rid of them for some time – previous treaties in 1867 and 1902 had proved abortive – and the Americans thought they might be of some strategic value, although they now mostly depend on tourism.

Clearly the Danes got the better of the deal. They also got from the Americans a declaration that the US had no objection to Danish sovereignty over Greenland, where Danish strategic interests and historical connection were much more engaged. But Greenland is where Trump now says he is set on further expansion: by purchase if possible, but also without ruling out the use of economic or even military coercion.

So when Greenland went to the polls yesterday, its geopolitical situation was the big issue. The territory has been self-governing since 1979; an upgrade to its status in 2009 further reduced Denmark’s role, but it retains control of defence and foreign affairs. Greenland’s current left-wing prime minister, Múte Bourup Egede, supports complete independence, but he and his party, Inuit Ataqatigiit, have soft-pedalled on the issue during the campaign in light of the Trumpian threat.

Egede’s coalition partner, Naleraq, is more strongly committed to independence, but also seen as more sympathetic to the US. In opposition are the traditional centre-left party, Siumut, which favors a more gradual approach to the independence question, as do the centre-right Democrats, traditionally more pro-Danish.

The results show a distinct lack of consensus on which line to take. Naleraq has roughly doubled its vote, to 24.8%. But most of that seems to have come at the expense of Inuit Ataqatigiit, which is down almost 16 points to 21.6%. Ahead of them both are the Democrats, whose vote has trebled to 30.3%. Siumut’s vote has halved, to 14.9%, with two small parties, Atassut and Qullec, bringing up the rear. (Official results are here; I’ve factored out the informals.)

That will give the Democrats ten of the 31 seats in the local parliament (up seven), with Naleraq eight (up four), Inuit Ataqatigiit seven (down five), Siumut four (down six) and Atassut two (unchanged). The current coalition could potentially carry on if it retained Atassut’s support, but in view of the Democrats’ big gains it would be hard to justify excluding them from government.

The US is a very rich and powerful country; although the Greenlanders are currently opposed to the idea, there’s no doubt that joining it would bring some benefits. But with a population of only around 57,000 it would be a doubtful contender for statehood (the current least-populous state, Wyoming, has about ten times as many). More likely it would remain a territory, like the US Virgin Islands: its people would become US citizens, but they would have no share in electing the president or congress.

Past controversies over territorial expansion have often turned on perceived advantages in domestic politics: southern Democrats in the nineteenth century, for example, were keen to acquire territory from Mexico because it was seen as favorable country for slavery and therefore for their political interests.

In the unlikely event that Greenland were to become a state, its two senators would be of some value, but otherwise there’s no likelihood of an American Greenland having much partisan political impact. The same cannot be said for Trump’s other, and much larger, northern target, namely Canada. We’ll have a look at it tomorrow.

.

* The United States was awarded a trusteeship over previously Japanese-controlled islands in Micronesia following the Second World War; most of them became independent in the 1980s and ’90s, but the Northern Marianas opted to stay with the US.