Japanese voters lose patience

Easily the biggest of last weekend’s elections, in Japan, was also the one with the most surprising result. Previewing it earlier this month I suggested that for new prime minister Shigeru Ishiba “winning the election will probably be fairly straightforward.” Not so. The polls turned against him a bit between then and polling day, but there was still little sign of what was coming.

At the previous election, in 2021, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) – which has been in power for almost all of Japan’s democratic history – won 259 of the 465 seats in the House of Representatives. Its junior coalition party, Komeito won another 32. Between them they only had 47.0% of the vote,* but the electoral system helps the LDP; 289 of the seats come from single-member districts, which are malapportioned to favor rural voters.

This time it was expected that the LDP would lose ground and probably have to rely on Komeito for a majority (as it already does in the upper house). The government has been hit by a major scandal over party slush funds, which brought down Ishiba’s predecessor, Fumio Kishida, but he clearly hoped that by going early and catching the opposition off guard he would be able to limit the damage.

Instead, voters have delivered a savage blow to the government. The coalition partners not only lost their majority but were not even close, falling to a combined total of 215 (191 LDP and 24 Komeito). The three main opposition parties – the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP), Ishin and the Democratic Party for the People (DPP) – finished almost exactly level with a total of 214 seats, up from 148 last time.

I can’t understand the official vote tally, which is a pdf in Japanese, but if the interpretation of it on Wikipedia is correct then the CDP, Ishin and the DPP in aggregate had 41.9% of the vote (up 3.4% on 2021), a clear lead over the LDP plus Komeito, who dropped nearly ten points to 37.7%. Turnout was down two points to 53.8%, suggesting that the scandals had bred disenchantment as well as anger.

It’s not at all clear what will happen next. The three main opposition parties are diverse ideologically, but may still be able to co-operate. To get to a majority they would need another 19 seats, and three left-wing parties have 18 between them: Reiwa Shinsengumi with nine, the Communists with eight and one Social Democrat. So the government would need everyone else in its corner: two small far-right parties with three seats each, and 12 independents. (Some of the independents are former LDP members who were disendorsed for their part in financial misbehavior; relying on them would be a bad look, and there are not enough of them anyway.)

The latest signs are that the DPP with its 28 seats might be willing to keep the LDP in power. Even if it were to abstain on a vote for prime minister, that would be enough to give Ishiba the edge over CDP leader (and former prime minister) Yoshihiko Noda. But the government’s longer-term prospects would be bleak: voters have clearly asked for change, and will only get more annoyed if they don’t get it.

It’s unfortunate (if understandable) that Japan has been overshadowed by next week’s election in the United States, since in an unprecedented election year – ten of the G20 members have gone to the polls already, with the US being the 11th – this has been one of the most momentous. Japan has been too much like a one-party state for far too long. If the CDP can make a credible bid for power, democracy will be the better for it.

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* That’s based on the vote for proportional seats; the aggregate for the single-member seats is much the same (49.6%), but the breakdown between the two parties is completely different, which is why I don’t bother giving it. There are similar but slightly less pronounced issues with the opposition parties.