As mentioned the other day, Serbia went to the polls on Sunday for an early parliamentary election. That’s not an unusual occurrence; this was the third election in three and a half years, with only one of the last five parliaments serving its full four-year term.
Although the system is parliamentary, real power in Serbia is held by the president, Alexander Vučić. His party, the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), first won power in 2012; Vučić became prime minister in 2014 and transferred to the presidency in 2017, being re-elected for a second term last year. Meanwhile, his party won a huge majority in the 2020 parliamentary election due to an opposition boycott.
This was generally regarded as unsatisfactory, and after dialogue with the opposition it was agreed to hold another election in April of last year, in conjunction with the presidential election. That returned the opposition to parliament, although very much in a minority: the main opposition ticket (then called United for the Victory of Serbia) won 14.1% of the vote and 38 of the 250 seats, a long way behind SNS’s 44.3% and 120 seats.
Nonetheless, that meant SNS no longer had a majority, forcing Vučić to rely on the post-Communist Socialist Party, which placed third with 11.8% and 31 seats, as a coalition partner. Four other parties cleared the 3% threshold: two smaller opposition tickets, one right and one left, with 15 and 13 seats respectively, and two far-right groups with ten seats each. Another 13 seats went to an assortment of minority ethnic parties, which are exempt from the threshold.
Discontent continued, with protests against Vučić’s growing authoritarianism, particularly after a mass shooting at a Belgrade school last May. And Vučić’s government, led by prime minister Ana Brnabić, was buffeted by geopolitical stresses from the war in Ukraine and continuing conflict over neighboring Kosovo. So Vučić decided to try to clear the air with another early election.
It appears to have worked (official results are here, although getting them to load properly is tricky). The SNS ticket has 48.0% of the vote and 128 seats, thus narrowly winning back its absolute majority. The Socialists, however, seem to have suffered from being in government, dropping to just 6.7% and 18 seats. Against them was the opposition ticket Serbia Against Violence with 24.3% and 65 seats.
Only two other tickets cleared the threshold this time: the right-wing opposition National Democratic Alternative (5.2%) and an anti-vax ticket (4.8%), with 13 seats each. The far-right National Gathering fell just short on 2.9%, having evidently bled some votes to the anti-vaxers. Ethnic minority parties, most of them broadly pro-government, again netted 13 seats.
Vučić’s drift to authoritarianism, especially via control of the media (a major ingredient in his victories), cannot be condoned. But it’s hard not to also sympathise with his position. He is trying to steer a delicate course between the aggressive nationalism of many of his country’s voters and the need for closer relations with the European Union; on top of that, no Serbian leader can completely break with traditional ally Russia.
The EU has not helped with its lead-footed approach to expansion in the Balkans, or with its inability to rein in Kosovo, which is clearly in the wrong in the most recent dispute. In turn, its failings provide Vučić with a convenient scapegoat. And his ability to juggle the competing claims of pro- and anti-Europeans has kept him, for now, in unchallenged control.
The World is Not Enough 